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The private sector bargaining process and 
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Pat Walsh* 
Introduction 
Over the last 2 decades, New Zealand's private sector industrial relations system has 
fragmented into a system in which bargaining takes place at a nu1nber of levels with mark-
edly differing procedures and criteria which lead to several different kinds of agreements. It 
is important that a satisfactory classification scheme be established for the variety of 
agreements now negotiated, since each category signifies something very different about 
the nature of the bargaining between unions and employers. If w~e leave to one side the 
vitally important area of unregistered agreements (which pose a different set of research 
problems), there is a general consensus that the classification syste1n used for registered 
agreements is unsatisfactory. 
The most recent effort to construct an alternative classification system is that of A.J. 
Geare in an article in this journal : "Formal coUective agreements in New Zealand private-
sector industrial relations'' (April 1983). This brief comment on Gear~e's article is divided 
into 2 parts : it is argued firstly, that Geare's analysis of settlement data is unacceptable 
and cannot be used to support the conclusions he draws; and secondly., that analysis based 
upon his classification system Inisrepresents the nature of the bargaining process. 
Aggregate settlement data 
Before turning to Geare's classification system, some initial comments on his analysis 
of aggregate settlement data are called for. In his first table (p.25) G~eare presents the 
aggregate nun1ber of arbitrated, conciliated and voluntary settlem~ents for the years 1975-
1981.. He observes that "Table 1 shows that, for 1979-1981, collective agreements (volun-
tary) form a much higher proportion of total collective agreements than they did in 1975-
1977" (p.24). In view of this statement, it is rather surprising that Geare gives only aggre-
gate numbers without giving the proportions. Once the proportions are calculated by the 
reader, it is found that in the 1975-1977 period, 51 percent of total settlements were 
voluntary (excluding the 5 composite agreements in 1975}, while for the 1979-1981 
period 59 percent were voluntary. 
It is not clear why Geare concludes that the 59 percent figure for the 1979-1981 period 
constitutes a "n1uch higher proportion'" than the 51 percent figure for the period 1975-
1977. To justify this conclusion Geare would need to offer a theory of the bargaining 
system that explained why a shift in the proportion of voluntary settlements from 51 
percent to 59 percent should be considered significant. In the absence of such a theory, 
the claim that 59 percent constitutes a ''much higher proportion" than 51 percent re-
mains purely a matter for debate, and a fruitless debate at that. 
A more fundamental problem is that Geare offers no explanations as to why the data 
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were grouped and analysed in this eay. Consequently, the groupings appear to be entirely 
arbitrary rather than being informed by any theoretical considerations. It appears that 
Geare wishes to show that the gross figures indicate an apparent increase in the proportion 
of voluntary settlements, but he offers no theoretical justification for his methodology. 
For exan1ple, there is no explanation given as to why 1978 is excluded from the analysis. 
The -exclusion of 1978 alters the conclusions. Once 1978 is restored to the data set and 
added to the earlier period, then the observed increase in the proportion of voluntary 
settlements declines noticeably, with 54 percent of settletnents in the 1975-1978 period 
being voluntary con1pared with 59 percent for 1979-1981. Its inclusion with the latter 
period makes only a negligible difference to the proportions. The real point is that if Geare 
wishes to group the data he should do it properly, and not arbitrarily ~xclude one year 
altogether. 
However since Geare offers no theoretical justification for grouping the data, and since 
bargaining occurs on an annual basis, it would seem tnore sensible to analyse each year 
separately in order to evaluate annual fluctuations. This is done in Table 1 which shows 
that the annual proportion of voluntary settlements has see-sawed quite markedly between 
1975 and 1981, and that the proportion for 1981 is precisely the same as in 1976.1 
Table 1 Voluntary settlenzents as a proportion of total settlements : 19 75-1981 
Year ending 31 March Total settlements Proportion voluntary (percent) 
1975 408 44 
1976 668 57 
1977 500 49 
1978 722 60 
1979 727 57 
1980 756 64 
1981 924 57 
Source: Geare ( 1983) Table 1. 
Fluctuations such as these are con1pletely obscured by an analysis based upon grouped 
data. By ignoring annual variations, tnisleading conclusions can be drawn about non-
existent trends. As Shalev observes in a con1ment upon Hibbs' {1978) analysis of strike 
trends since 1900, " ... in all countries the occurrence of extreme fluctuations, however 
occasional, 1nakes the use of periodized data a hazardous venture" (Shalev, 1978, p.438). 
These hazards loom even larger in analyzing a 7 year period that exhibits such striking 
annual fluctuations. Thus, Geare's . conclusion that there has been an apparently significant 
increase in the proportion of voluntary settle1nents is not supported by a more appropriate 
method of analysis. 
1 Quite clearly, something is causing these annual fluctuations. A full analysis of this is outside the 
scope of this article. Ho\vever, it is possible to suggest some tentative hypotheses. Unions and 
employers may register an initial voluntary collective agreement (VCA) in order to establish a house 
relativity with the award or another VCA, and subsequently maintain that relativity by means of 
unregistered agreements. This would gtnerate annual fluctuations in the number of registered VCAs. 
Secondly, during the 1970s a number of VCAs were for a term of 18 months or 2 years, with a 
wages-reopening (or "common interest") clause after 12 months. The new wage rate (and any other 
matters renegotiated) would then be registered as a variation on the original VCA, and not as a new 
VCA. Finally, the Court at times pennitted the backdating of agreements, which could thus expire 
in the same year as they were registered. This meant that it was quite possible for a union and 
employer to register 2 VCAs in the same year. These latter 2 factors would contribute to the obser-
ved 2-yearly cycle in the proportion of registered VCAs. These hypotheses are based on an initial 
examination of registered agreements, and I hope to conrmn or reject them in subsequent research. 
Registered coUective agreements 199 
~ Geare 's classification system 
It 
n Geare's alternative classification system and its application to 1980 is shown in Table 
2. Clearly there is, as Geare points out, a need to distinguish between arbitrated and con-
ciliated awards, and the failure of the present classification system to do this is inexcusable. 
This paper is concerned with Geare 's distinction between principal and supplementary 
agreements, and his analysis based on that. 
Table 2 Collective arrangenzents under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 reached in 1980 
Collective arrangement 
Involving registered unions 
A wards : arbitrated (principal) 
Aw,ards: conciliated (principal) 
Collective agreetnents (principal) 
Co.llective agr,e,etnents (suppletnentary) 
Cotnposite agreenzents (principal) 
Cotnposite agreements (supplenzentary) 
Involving unregister~ed societies 
Voluntary agreernents (principal) 
Volunt,ary agree1nents (suppletnentary) 
Source: Geare (1983) Table 2. 
Number 
7 
263 
315 
196 
27 
10 
31 
2 
Geare argues (p.24) that voluntary settlen1ents should be classified into principal and 
supplementary documents, and that when this is done, the trend towards voluntary settle-
ments which he has observed (but which the analysis above casts doubt upon) is shown in 
a new light. Geare defines a principal docun1ent as one "'which stands by itself \Vith regard 
to questions governing the work environ1nent" (p.24). A supplementary document "is one 
which is the authority for only a sn1all proportion of rules and n1ust be read in conjunction 
with a principal docun1ent'' (p.24). He argues that if a large proportion of voluntary agree-
ments are supplen1entary docu1nents, then we cannot conclude that there is a trend away 
fron1 conciliation towards independence for negotiators and the development of genuine 
voluntary negotiations. 
Geare then classifies agreen1ents in 1980 into principal and supplementary docutnents, 
r and concludes that "in 1980, at any rate , a large proportion of collective agreements were 
supplen1entary'~ (p.24). In fact, as Geare's O\Vn data (reproduced in Table 2) show, 38 
percent of VCAs in 1980 were supplnl'entary agreements , while the great majority - 62 
percent - were principal. In addition , only 27 percent of con1posite agreements and 6 
percent of voluntary agreetnents \Vere supplen1entary docun1ents. It is possible that these 
represent large figures for supplen1entary agreements, but we can only judge this by com-
parison with other years. Data based upon one year tell us nothing about longer-term 
trends. Geare gives no reason for his exclusive focus on 1980. He does not suggest that 
1980 is typical of all other years, and there is certainly no a priori reason to suspect that 
it is. Certainly Geare's in1plied reservation about the reliance on 1980 ( ... "in 1980, at 
any rate . . . ") suggests an awareness on his part of its tnethodologica1 and theoretical 
fragility. Nor will it do to argue that the 1980 figures are suggestive or heuristic. They are 
suggestive of what happened in 1980 and no more than that. 
~Geare's analysis 
It should be not~ed that the principal/supplen1entary document distinction itself may 
offer a fruitful basis for analysis, and indeed Law ( 1981) has used a similar classification 
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systen1 to analyse the distribution of particular provisions across national, principal and 
suppletnentary docun1ents. The tnajor objection here is to the analysis which Geare tnakes, 
based upon his classification systen1. 
~lowever, it is itnportant to be precise about the status of VCAs, whether principal or 
supplen1entary, and the relationship between the two kinds of VCAs. Geare observes 
(p.24) that a supplen1entary agreetnent n1ust be read in conjuction with a principal agree-
nlent for those tnatters not included in the supplen1entary agreen1ent. This is quite true, 
but, it should be pointed out that a supple1nentary VCA cannot be read in conjunction 
with a principal VCA, but only with an award. A VCA cannot refer back to (or '~.super­
impose on") another VCA. It should also be noted that a VCA, by virtue of section 65 (8) 
of the Industrial Relations Act, supersedes any award that might otherwise apply. This 
means that it is possible for a VCA to set tenns which are inferior to those in the award. 
Exan1ples of this are rare but not unknown.2 
As noted above, Geare concludes that the proliferation of suppletnentary agree1nents 
that settle only a stnall nutnber of issues cannot support any conclusion about a shift 
towards genuine voluntary negotiations and the independence of negotiators. This involves 
an assutnption that all issues in an agreetnent are of equal significance in its negotiation, 
and that we can learn son1ething fron1 counting the nun1ber of issues settled in an agree-
nlent. But all issues are not born equal. Many are settled before any negotiation takes 
place and typically "negotiation" involves their ritualistic insertion into the agree1nent. 
So1ne are prescribed by statute - hours of work, the tern1 of the agreement, public holi-
days, annual holidays, certain safety standards, right of entry for union officials, disputes 
of right procedures, and personal grievance procedures,3 while others are prescribed by 
custom and practice that leave very little flexibility for negotiators - the unqualified 
preference clause , payment of wages , stnokos, meal breaks, overtime rates etc. In practice, 
the nu1n ber of issues that are actually negotiated n1ay be quite sn1all. Of those that are 
negotiated, the crucial issues are usually those concerning basic wage rates and allowances, 
and in the negotiation of tnost awards and agreen1ents these are heavily influenced by the 
pattern set in the trendsetting awards (Bradford, 1983). 
Thus we learn nothing of any significance about the autonon1y of negotiators fron1 
counting the nun1ber of issues settled in an agreen1ent. The autonon1y of negotiators can 
only be assessed by evaluating the substance of the issues settled. Where negotiators of any 
agree1nent - be it -'principal" or "supplen1entary" - negotiate tenns that depart fro1n the 
prevailing trend, then we 1nay speak of their autonomy., regardless of the number of 
clauses in the agreetnent. This is particularly so where the negotiators depart from pre-
vailing trends in settling the crucial issues of wages and allowances, or other issues that 1nay 
2 Con1pare the provisions for \vages and allowances in the I nvercargill City, Gore Borough, Bluff 
Borough, Gardeners, Labourers and Other \Vorkers VCAs in 1979 and 1980 (Book of Awards, 79, 
7271; and 80, 7117) with the Ne\v Zealand (with exceptions) Local Bodies Gardeners, Labourers 
and General \Vorkers A\vards of those years (Book of Awards, 79, 5775; and 80, 1569). Although 
the tenns of the documents are not precisely the same, in each year the VCA was registered after the 
a\vard and contained rates inferior to the award. The net effect was that for several months in each 
year, the workers covered by the VCA were paid at below-award rates. It is possible that as employer 
opposition to the award system grows, employers may co1ne to view this as an effective strategy to 
impose belo\v-award conditions. 
3 Of course these issues are not entirely removed from the realm of bargaining. For example, where 
the normal working week goes beyond the prescribed 40 hours, the parties will need to negotiate the 
appropriate terms of employment. Alternatively, some unions may seek to improve upon the terms 
prescribed by the legislation, such as by obtaining an extra week's holiday after a specified period of 
service with the long-term aim of eventually securing a change to the legislation. In the area of dis-
putes and grievance procedures, the legislation makes alternative grievance and disputes procedures 
possible, but Miller's analysis suggests that the vast majority of agreements follow the procedure in 
the legislation (1983 , p . 8). Thus the bargaining situation is always fluid, and particular agreements 
Inay depart marginally or, more rarely, significantly from the tenns prescribed by statute. However, 
at a general level, direct challenges to statutorily prescribed terms of employment are not a pro-
nlinent feature of the system. (for instance even the celebrated "evasions" in the 1970s of statu-
torily prescribed \Vage levels were usually conducted by means of the legally permitted safety valves 
of "serious anomalies" or "exceptional circumstances".) 
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be significant at a particular time, such as redundancy payments in the mid-1970s. 
Consequently, if suppletnentary agreen1ents involve terms of en1ployment that depart 
from prevailing trends, especially on significant issues, then they are very in1portant docu-
ments indeed, and their proliferation would indicate precisely that growing independence 
of negotiators that ~Geare argues against. Since Geare's counting n1ethod tells us nothing 
about the substance of the rules in 1nost supplen1entary documents, we cannot be certain 
whether this is the case or not. l~owever, Geare does observe that a large number of supple: 
mentary documents in l 980 were negotiated by the Engine-Drivers Union, and involved 
"improved service and shift allowances, meal money and extra n1onies for particular 
working conditions" (p.26). These agreen1ents also settled the basic wage rate for the 
workers covered by the1n. This suggests that these supple1nentary documents concerned 
precisely those issues that are the essence of negotiations. 
This conclusion is further supported when we consider that the 1980 Engine-Drivers' 
agreements were the continuation of a campaign begun by the union in 1979 to secure 
both these payn1ents and the registration allowance for boiler-attendants through volun-
tary agreen1ents. In announcing the house agreement campaign, the vice-president of the 
union stated that the award had beco1ne ahnost irrelevant to the union as it covered only 
25 percent of the 1nen1bership, and set a basic rate of $3 .2~0 per hour compared with an 
Auckland freezing industry ruling rate of $4.7 l per hour (Evening Post, 10 January 1979}. 
If anything then, it is the award which is the ''supple1nentary" agree1nent in this case, 
with house agreements settling the most ilnportant issues, including the basic wage rate, 
and the award settling those other issues for which the scope of negotiation is severely 
constrained by legislation or custo1n. The union embarked upon this strategy w]}en the 
Govenunent threatened to issue regulations preventing the negotiation of these payments 
in the award. The campaign gathered further tnomentuin in 1980 when the Government 
did issue regulations under the Ren1.uneration Act to detern1ine the tenns of the award. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the successful campaign by the Engine-Drivers Union 
to negotiate certain payments through voluntary agreements (''supplementary docu-
Inents") in the face of threatened and then actual governn1ent regulation constitutes a 
remarkable degree of independence on the part of the negotiators, and a significant shift 
away fro1n conciliation and towards genuine voluntary negotiations. 
It is also important to point out that Geare's supplementary agreen,ent category con-
tains a heterogenous group of documents. As he points out (p . 27), another larg~e group of 
these agree1nents that were negotiated in 1980 included those negotiated by the Canter-
bury Clerical Workers Union, in whjch the only variation frotn the national award was the 
provision for the autotnatic deduction of union subscriptions fron1 workers' wages. These 
docutnents involved procedural n1atters, and were very different frotn those negotiated by 
the Engine-Drivers Union which established 1najor variations from the award on substan-
tive n1atters. If the principal /supplementary agreen1ent distinction is to be useful, it needs 
to distinguish between procedural and substantive agreements. ~Clearly the reasons for the 
negotiation of the Clerical Workers' agreen1ents were quite different fro1n those that led 
the Engine-Drivers into their agree1nents, and each signifies so1nething different about the 
industrial relations syste1n. A classification system wltich classifies them as one honlo-
genous category ignores this, and misrepresents the bargaining process. 
The Engine-Drivers' house agree1nent catnpaign further illustrates Geare's failure to take 
full account of the reasons why one kind of agreen1ent is negotiated rather than anotl}er. 
Geare analyses this simply in tem1s of a 2-party relationship in which union and employer 
preference for a particular kind of agreen1ent can be understood in terms of their strategic 
evaluation of such variables as the blanket clause, the concentration of union m~embership, 
the degree of membership cohesion and loyalty, and employer differences in profitability, 
amenability to voluntary agreen1ents and tnode of operation (p.27-7). But the predominant 
characteristic of the bargaining system in the period under consideration was that it was a 
3-party relationship involving almost continuous State intervention, or threatened inter-
vention. The bargaining choices that unions and employers make, and the corresponding 
changes in the types of settlements reached must be analysed in terms of this historical 
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context.4 
These problems are illustrated more vividly in Geare's discussion of composite agree-
Inents, where he argues that the choice to adopt or not adopt the composite agreement 
option is determined by the simplicity of the procedure for its negotiation. He states that: 
The pnrpose of the composite agreement is to substitute one agreement for many, on a 
major project or in a major concern. The concept was introduced in 1962 but did not 
prove popular as the procedure then specified was complex (in contrast to the simplified 
procedure introduced in the 1973 legislation] (p. 2 7). 
A number of objections can be made to this. First, the "concept'' of a composite 
agreement was not "introduced" in 1962. The legislation setting out a procedure for their 
negotiation was enacted in 1962, but the concept was "introduced" at least a decade 
earlier with the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement at the Roxburgh hydro-electric 
site in 1952 and the negotiation of comprehensive (composite) agreements at other major 
sites such as Mere-Mere, Kawerau, and Marsden Point in subsequent years.5 
Secondly, Geare's account of the "purpose" of a composite agreement is simply a 
formal statement of what a co1nposite agreement is and actually says nothing at all about 
its purpose. The composite agreement constitutes a rationalisation of the bargaining struc-
ture on major sites for the purpose of overcoming the problems posed for management by 
1nultiple agreements. These problems involved firstly the inappropriateness of awards or 
agreements negotiated outside the site for the settlement of issues which arose out of the 
very different employment conditions on site. Secondly, the existence of multiple agree-
ments with the numerous unions on site, posed management with constant pressure from 
the different unions to grant terms more favourable than those enjoyed by other unions. 
This pressure led to a ratcheting upwards of wages, allowances and conditions on site and 
to a disturbance of existing relativities which had implications for sub-contractors on site 
and for employers outside. Thus the provision for composite agreements in the 1962 Act 
was an employer-initiated proposal which unions strongly opposed from when it was first 
suggested in the mid-1950s until it was finally enacted in 1962. Its purpose was to over-
come the problems for employers posed by a fragmented bargaining structure, which, in 
turn, was a consequence of the fragmented union structure imposed by industrial legisla-
tion. 
Geare's argument that composite agreements did not prove popular in the 1960s 
because the procedure was complex is equally misleading. In fact, composite agreements 
were initially unpopular with unions after the 1962 legislation because they were viewed as 
a government/employer strategy to eliminate a bargaining leverage for unions, and because 
they were seen as a threat to union autonomy. This latter factor was particularly impor-
tant in the negotiation of composite agreements after 1962. The unions had agreed to the 
comprehensive agreements of the 1950s on sites such as Roxburgh where the vast majority 
of workers were covered by the New Zealand Workers Union, and on other sites where 
they were settled in direct bargaining outside the arbitration system. But on sites where 
1nany unions had a significant presence, efforts to impose a composite agreement within 
the arbitration system triggered union resistance against a dictated bargaining procedure, 
sparked intense inter-union conflict over jurisdictional matters, and led to bitter accusa-
tions that the agreement negotiated was less favourable than an individual union had 
already negotiated elsewhere, or would have negotiated on the project if left to negotiate 
alone. Indeed, the negotiation of the Manapouri composite agreement in 1963 involved 
fierce union clashes at Arbitration Court hearings, appeals to higher courts, a decision by 
the Workers Union to withdraw from the FOL (subsequently reversed) and frequent 
4 This is not to suggest that the nature of the bargaining system was exclusively cletetudned by State 
intervention, but rather that this intervention was the predominant characteristic of the 
system in that period, and that any analysis which excludes consideration of it does so at peat periL 
5 See Federation of Labour Bulletin 2 (8), 1963 for a summuy of this. 
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inter-union conferences to settle the intense conflicts that had been generated.6 
Unions attitudes slowly changed as they adjusted then1selves to a co-operative bargaining 
strategy, resolved the jurisdictional conflicts, and began to realize that the capital-intensive 
nature of major projects permitted the negotiation of very favourable terms of employ-
ment. These could be used to put pressure on other employers, through the house bargain-
ing strategy discussed above. These changes, combined with the rather obvious fact that 
there were more major projects and large manufacturing concerns in the 1970s than in the 
1960s, help explain the greater number of composite agreements in the 1970s as much, if 
not more than Geare's emphasis on the sin1plified procedures set out in the 1973legislation. 
However, the problems associated with composite agree1nents have not been entirely 
overcome as Albury (1983), writing in the san1e symposium as ~Geare, illustrates with his 
analysis of the maritime composite agreement. Indeed Albury's analysis, which is finnly 
grounded in an explanation of the particular union/employer/government relations in the 
maritime industry, contributes more to an understanding of industrial relations than does 
Geare's formal and ahistorical sweep across the board canvas. 
Conclusion 
The construction of categories exercises a strong influence upon subsequent research, 
and directs attention to certain questions and areas rather than others. We perceive and 
understand the world by n1eans of the categories we look through, and if they are deve-
loped in isolation froJn the real world, subsequent research based upon them will be 
silnilarly isolated. Thus ~Geare's classification system would categorise the Engine-Drivers' 
award as a principal docun1ent that "stands alone". But it only stands alone because the 
iinportant matters are settled elsewhere. Secondly, fully half of his article comes under the 
heading "The choice of agree1nents", where he quite properly attempts to explain why 
different kinds of agreements are chosen rather than others. Without this, his classification 
syste1n would "stand alone" as an atheoretical exercise divorced from the explanation of 
the real world of industrial relations. Unfortunately, his analysis of the process of choice 
is inadequate. 
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